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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0063

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000352

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA (T.KOCA), SCA/RA (J.MCCLELLAN), AND EUR/CE
(J.HIRONIMUS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018

TAGS: [PARM](#) [ETTC](#) [PREL](#) [IN](#) [SZ](#)

SUBJECT: INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT: SWISS HAVE
TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, AND WOULD WELCOME BRIEFING BY INDIA

REF: STATE 74896

Classified By: Poloff Chris Buck; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel message July 14 to Jean-Daniel Praz, Acting Director of the MFA's Arms Control and Disarmament Section, and MFA POC for IAEA issues. In a follow-up meeting on July 21, Praz said that the Swiss government had not yet reached a decision with regard to the position it will take on the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, but would discuss the matter further early the week of July

¶28. He remarked that the GOS has "technical questions" related to the preamble of the agreement, specifically with regard to the references to "fuel assurances" and to "corrective measures."

¶2. (C) With regard to fuel assurances, Praz questioned how the IAEA could make such a commitment, since no such mechanisms currently exist and, in any case, presumably would require the assistance of IAEA member states. As to "corrective measures," Praz commented that the GOS was not fully satisfied with the Indian government's explanation thus far. Poloff reiterated reftel points regarding our view of the status and substance of the preambular language of the agreement. Praz maintained that the GOS nonetheless would be interested in receiving more details.

¶3. (C) Praz said that the GOS also was curious as to how/when the GOI would identify facilities to be placed under safeguards, and whether facilities/materials would be fully or, in some cases, only partially under safeguards. With regard to the "fully vs. partially" question, Praz said that several paragraphs of the agreement prompted this question. He said that the GOS had been disappointed that the Indian government had canceled plans last week to provide a technical briefing to IAEA delegations, and expressed the hope that India would re-consider. Praz added that Switzerland would prefer to ask such technical questions in the context of such a briefing, rather than during the August 1 Board meeting.

¶4. (C) Though unable to comment definitively on the GOS position on the safeguards agreement, Praz acknowledged that Switzerland has no concerns with regard to India and "(horizontal) proliferation." He indicated that the Swiss decision most likely would be based on a general assessment of the importance of the initiative to Swiss-Indian and Swiss-U.S. relations. In any case, while the GOS position on the safeguards agreement would be formulated at the inter-agency "office" level, Praz said that any NSG exception on behalf of India would require a decision to be taken at the level of the Swiss Federal Council (Executive Cabinet). In this context he said that, if the safeguards agreement is

approved by the IAEA Board, the GOS will be very interested in having more details soon on how the USG would intend to proceed in the NSG. (Note: The Federal Council currently is on summer recess, with the first regular meeting scheduled for August 20. End Note)

CONEWAY